By Raphael Nkolwoudou, PhD in Law, Senior Lawyer in digital law and Contract Manager, Teragone Solutions – Paris, France.
Imagine a field hospital in northern Mozambique, after a cyclone. The roads are cut off, the relay antennas lie on the ground, and the only link with the outside world is a thin beam rising towards a swarm of low-orbit satellites. This scene, experienced recently during cyclone Idai, sums up the promise of satellite constellations: to offer reliable communication when everything collapses around. For Africa, it is not a luxury. It is a necessity. The continent remains highly exposed to violent storms, devastating floods, and power outages that also paralyze digital infrastructures. In white areas, where no terrestrial operator ventures due to lack of profitability, the satellite becomes the last resort. African digital infrastructures, although booming, remain vulnerable. A violent storm in Douala, a flood in Maputo, or a drought disrupting power plants supplying relay antennas: 4G or fiber networks can be paralyzed when they are most needed.
In this context, low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks like Starlink, OneWeb, or the future African project (Sanu-Sat) offer a rare promise: resilient communication, disconnected from terrestrial hazards. For emergency services, isolated hospitals, or post-disaster areas, this capacity is vital.
In this new column, we balance the public utility of satellites in Africa and the necessary preservation of state sovereignty, as whoever controls the signal partly controls the state.
I. When sovereignty evaporates in orbit
Let’s take a moment to look at the problem from the right angle. An operator like Starlink, OneWeb, or any other global actor proposes to cover an African country without installing much concrete: ground relay stations, a few routers, but the essential intelligence – satellites, command centers, data servers – remains out of reach, often thousands of kilometers away, under foreign jurisdictions. Therefore, what can an African state do when sensitive communications pass through this space? In theory, very little. In practice, almost nothing without prior negotiation. For example, Namibian authorities announced on Monday, March 23 that they rejected the license application from the American satellite internet service provider Starlink. They then explained that Elon Musk’s company did not meet all the required conditions to operate in the country. So, the issue for Africa is not to reject the satellite, but to integrate it as a strategic complement to historical operators.
Let’s also consider the data issue. A ministry, a central bank, an electricity company uses a satellite link to secure its exchanges. These data pass through gateways located in another country, may be temporarily stored on servers in Europe or the United States. In case of dispute, cyberattack, or simply national investigation, the local authority faces a wall: it has no way to compel the operator to provide the information, or even to locate the traffic. Digital sovereignty, so dear to official speeches, becomes an empty shell.
Even more worrying: legal oversight. Any telecommunications law requires operators to allow authorities, under judicial control, to intercept communications for reasons of public security. But how to intercept a signal that never descends to the ground, or that uses undeclared access stations? Low Earth orbit constellations are designed to be stealthy from a regulatory point of view: a terminal can connect to a satellite without ever going through an identifiable local infrastructure. In some countries, there has already been a massive influx of individually imported Starlink terminals, bypassing any license, turning each user into a de facto operator. Faced with this, the classic legal arsenal seems outdated.
II. A structural transformation of electronic communications law
The rise of low Earth orbit satellite constellations disrupts traditional categories of electronic communications law. While terrestrial operators rely on infrastructures physically located on national territory, LEO constellations operate from an extraterritorial architecture, the essential elements of which – satellites, gateways, data centers – largely escape local jurisdiction. This technical extraterritoriality forces African states to rethink the classical concepts of electronic communications licensing, universal service, and regulatory supervision.
In this new paradigm, the question is no longer just whether an operator is authorized to provide a service, but how a state can exercise its sovereign control over an infrastructure that is not physically present on its territory, while ensuring security, fair competition, and data protection.
III. Public benefits: connectivity, resilience, and public interest
Satellite constellations meet a structural need: the persistence of vast white areas, especially in rural, mountainous, or sparsely populated regions. For many African states, the coverage requirement imposed on terrestrial operators has not been sufficient to reduce these disparities. The satellite offers an immediate, technically robust, and economically viable solution to ensure service continuity where terrestrial networks cannot be deployed at a reasonable cost.
Beyond connectivity, constellations play a crucial role in communication resilience. In case of floods, violent storms, or extreme droughts, terrestrial infrastructures can be damaged or rendered inoperative. The satellite then becomes a backup network, essential for government communications, humanitarian coordination, and critical service continuity. This dimension of national security fully justifies the integration of the satellite into national crisis management strategies.
IV. Legal risks: sovereignty, jurisdiction, and regulatory asymmetry
However, the integration of satellite constellations raises major legal issues. The first concerns data sovereignty. Flows often pass through gateways located outside the national territory, exposing data to foreign laws, especially those related to government access. This situation raises questions about compliance with national data protection laws, public security requirements, and judicial cooperation obligations.
The second issue concerns the regulatory asymmetry between terrestrial operators and satellite operators. The former bear heavy obligations: territorial coverage, spectrum fees, sectoral taxes, service quality requirements. The latter, on the other hand, benefit from a lighter model, which can weaken local operators and create a competition distortion. It then becomes necessary to rethink regulatory fairness mechanisms to prevent technological innovation from leading to economic imbalance.
Finally, several states have started to impose requirements on satellite operators for local capital participation, establishment, or local legal representation. These measures, far from being protectionist, aim to ensure economic anchoring and legal responsibility on national territory.
V. Towards an African model of regulatory governance
To reconcile innovation and sovereignty, an African model of governance must emerge. It could be based on a strengthened satellite licensing regime, integrating obligations of technical transparency, cooperation in national security matters, and flow supervision, even when infrastructures are located outside the territory.
This model should also establish a principle of regulatory fairness, ensuring technological neutrality between terrestrial and satellite operators. This could involve an equivalent contribution to universal service, spectrum usage fees, or service quality obligations adapted to satellite specificities.
The issue of sensitive data localization or duplication is another essential pillar. States could require local hosting of certain data categories, duplication of technical logs, or the establishment of data sharing agreements between operators and authorities. These mechanisms would preserve sovereignty while respecting the technical constraints specific to constellations.
Finally, the integration of the satellite into the national ecosystem requires articulation with cybersecurity policies, spectrum management plans, and crisis alert and management devices. The satellite should not be seen as a substitute for terrestrial networks, but as a strategic complement, essential for resilience and digital inclusion.
VI. Conclusion: an open digital sovereignty to innovation
Africa is at a turning point. Satellite constellations offer a unique opportunity to reduce digital divides, strengthen communication resilience, and support economic transformation. But this opportunity can only be fully seized if it is embedded in a clear, balanced, and sovereign legal framework.
The challenge is not to oppose satellite and terrestrial infrastructures, but to build a hybrid ecosystem capable of ensuring security, fair competition, and control of digital flows. It is under these conditions that Africa can benefit from the satellite revolution without renouncing its sovereignty.
