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**By Professor Abderrahmane Mebtoul, university professor, PhD in strategic management, international expert**
The third Russia-Africa Summit, held on October 28 and 29, 2026, in Moscow, brought together delegations from 48 African countries, including over 20 heads of state, as well as representatives from the African Union. Participants adopted an action plan for the period 2027-2029 aimed at strengthening their political, economic, and strategic cooperation. Beyond asserting a multipolar world order, the challenge remains translating diplomatic commitments into mutually beneficial economic partnerships.
The action plan covers 19 sectors, including security, defense, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, agriculture, energy, civil nuclear, and health. It also aims to promote trade settlements in national currencies to reduce dependence on international currencies.
But what is Russia’s actual position in the economic exchanges of the African continent? And to what extent can Moscow transform its political and military influence into sustainable commercial and industrial partnerships?
### 1. Two Resource-Rich Areas, but with Different Economic Structures
With a population estimated at 1.58 billion and a total GDP of $3.179 trillion in 2025, Africa represents a significant market. However, economic disparities remain substantial: 15 countries account for nearly 80% of the continent’s GDP.
According to data from Afreximbank included in this analysis, African exports reach $685.2 billion, compared to $781.5 billion in imports, reflecting a structural trade deficit.
On its side, Russia has an estimated GDP of $2.561 trillion, with exports of $418.3 billion and imports of $279 billion in 2025. Its international reserves would reach $729.6 billion by the end of October 2026.
Both regions have significant natural resources. Russia is among the world’s leading producers of oil, gas, coal, and strategic metals. Africa, for its part, holds about 30% of the world’s reserves of essential minerals, including cobalt, manganese, platinum, copper, and graphite.
The Democratic Republic of Congo alone accounts for an estimated 70% to 84% of global cobalt production, while South Africa holds about 80% of the world’s platinum reserves.
However, this potential complementarity does not guarantee a balanced partnership. The fundamental question remains that of local resource processing, technology transfer, and value creation on the continent.
### 2. A Russian Strategy Dominated by Security and Natural Resources
Moscow’s African strategy pursues several objectives: consolidating its political alliances, expanding its trade opportunities, and enhancing its international influence in a context marked by Western sanctions related to the war in Ukraine.
Military cooperation is one of the main instruments of this presence. Russia is involved in the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Niger through defense agreements, equipment deliveries, and security arrangements, including the Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group’s activities.
According to statements from the public agency Rosoboronexport cited in this analysis, Moscow has signed nearly 150 military contracts with 46 African countries since 2023, amounting to over $20 billion. Algeria and Egypt are among its main clients.
This security influence, however, contrasts with a still limited economic presence. Russian direct investments represent less than 1% of total foreign investments in Africa.
During the Russia-Africa summit in 2023, Vladimir Putin announced the cancellation of $23 billion in African debts, primarily inherited from the Soviet era.
Economically, Russian interests focus on mining, hydrocarbons, fertilizers, grains, and energy infrastructure. Moscow is particularly looking to expand its activities in gold, uranium, and lithium, especially in Sahel countries.
However, trade remains heavily unbalanced in favor of Russia.
### 3. Russia-Africa: Only $27.8 Billion in Trade
In 2025, trade between Russia and Africa is estimated at **$27.8 billion**, including $24.3 billion in Russian exports to the continent and only $3.5 billion in imports from African countries.
Thus, Africa’s trade deficit with Russia reaches $20.8 billion.
Africa accounts for only about 3.9% of Russia’s foreign trade. More than 70% of Russia-Africa trade is concentrated among a few partners, primarily Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa.
The stated goal is to increase this trade to between $40 billion and $60 billion by 2030. This ambition assumes a diversification of trade relations, currently dominated by Russian exports of grains, fertilizers, petroleum products, and military equipment.
In comparison, other major economic partners of Africa have a considerable lead.
### 4. The European Union and China Dominate Trade with Africa
The European Union remains the continent’s largest trading partner when considered as an economic bloc, with about **€355 billion in goods trade**, nearly $390 billion, plus more than €110 billion in services trade. Its stock of direct investments in Africa would exceed €250 billion.
China occupies a dominant position among bilateral partners. In 2025, Sino-African trade is expected to reach **$348 billion**, an increase of 17.7% year-on-year. Chinese exports to Africa amount to $225 billion, compared to $123 billion in imports from the continent.
India is also confirming its rise, with bilateral trade estimated between $93.6 billion and $103 billion for the period 2024-2025. Its presence is notably strengthening in pharmaceuticals, information technology, and telecommunications.
Trade between the United States and Africa fluctuates between $60 billion and $70 billion annually, with a stock of direct investments estimated between $40 billion and $50 billion.
Turkey continues its expansion, with trade between $36.5 billion and $40 billion and cumulative construction and engineering contracts exceeding $85 billion.
Gulf Cooperation Council countries are increasingly prominent in African economic relations. Their trade with the continent is valued at **$121 billion**, while announced cumulative investments would reach $179 billion, dominated by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Japan and South Korea complete this landscape, with trade estimated between $17.8 billion and $25 billion for Japan and about $20.45 billion for South Korea.
These data illustrate the gap between Moscow’s geopolitical influence and its actual commercial weight on the continent. Russia-Africa trade remains nearly thirteen times lower than that of China and about fourteen times lower than that of the European Union.
Russia thus has significant room for growth, but its economic ambitions face competition from partners already well established.
### 5. African Integration, a Condition for a Balanced Partnership
The challenge for Africa is not to substitute one dependency for another but to diversify its partnerships while strengthening its productive capacities.
Today, intra-African trade represents only 15% to 18% of the continent’s exports, compared to over 60% in Europe and about 38% in Asia.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is, in this regard, a strategic instrument. It aims to create an integrated market of nearly 1.5 billion consumers by gradually eliminating tariffs on 90% of tariff lines.
However, its success will depend on several conditions: developing transport and energy infrastructures, reducing non-tariff barriers, harmonizing regulations, financing trade, and strengthening payment systems in local currencies.
Cooperation with Russia, as with China, Europe, the United States, India, or Gulf countries, should therefore be evaluated based on its contribution to industrialization, technology transfer, employment, and the creation of local added value.
The real challenge is not just to increase trade volumes but to change their structure to reduce Africa’s dependence on raw material exports.
### Conclusion: Africa Will Be What Africans Want It to Be
The third Russia-Africa Summit confirms Moscow’s desire to consolidate its influence on the continent and participate in the reconfiguration of international balances.
However, with $27.8 billion in trade and a still marginal share in foreign direct investments, Russia remains a second-tier economic partner compared to the European Union, China, and several emerging powers.
For Africa, the challenge goes beyond choosing between Western and Eastern partners. It lies in its ability to negotiate balanced agreements, transform its resources locally, and build an integrated continental market.
**In a multipolar world, economic sovereignty is not decreed: it is built through diversified partnerships, productive investment, and regional integration. Africa will be, above all, what Africans want it to be.**
