Dakar-Bamako Corridor: the southern route cannot bear Mali alone

By Amara Dramé, CEO of GRACECORP AMD GROUP (GraceRoad)

Since the closure of the Kidira route, freight departing from the port of Dakar to Mali passes through Kédougou and the Moussala border post. Truck queues are getting longer, trucks are in short supply, and Malian roads are deteriorating. Some measures, mostly within reach, would limit the damage while waiting for the reopening of the northern axis.

With Abidjan, the port of Dakar is one of the two main entry points for Mali. For years, most of the freight took the northern route, through Tambacounda, Kidira, and Kayes. This pattern no longer holds. The fuel blockade announced on September 3, 2025 by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), reinstated at the end of April 2026 after coordinated attacks on April 25, has made the Kidira-Kayes axis the most exposed to attacks against convoys, according to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa). Tankers now only travel there under military escort.

Kidira closed, Moussala saturated

On October 1st, during a visit to the Moussala border post in the Kédougou region, Senegalese Interior Minister Mouhamadou Makhtar Cissé observed a queue of trucks several tens of kilometers long. He directly linked it to the situation of the northern axis: “the Kidira route is closed,” he reminded, before asking to speed up the work on the last section, as reported by APS and PressAfrik.

The phenomenon is not new, but it is worsening. On August 13, a mission from the Senegalese Shippers’ Council already noted a queue of about 15 kilometers at Moussala, with about ten kilometers of unpaved road. Seven weeks later, the queue has grown even longer.

The traffic diversion has chain effects. In Kédougou, gasoline was lacking in several stations at the end of September, according to SeneNews. In Kidira, APS described in August merchants and transporters losing business.

Fewer trucks, and worn-out roads

The corridor also lacks trucks. Attacks destroy tankers by the dozens: at the end of January 2026, several dozen were set on fire between the Senegalese border and Kayes, and at least fifteen drivers were killed, according to France 24 and AFP. In November 2025, JNIM had declared tanker drivers as “military targets,” reported Jeune Afrique, which also cited in March 2026 the shortage of tanker trucks and the reluctance of transporters as causes of disruptions in Bamako.

The demand for trucks is rising elsewhere in the region. Burkina Faso aims for around 532,000 tons of cottonseed for the 2026-2027 campaign, 69% more than the previous one, with collection starting in October, according to leFaso.net. This collection will also mobilize a large number of trucks.

Furthermore, Malian roads themselves are worn out. In June 2026, the Malian Union of Road Transporters, SYNACOR, threatened to suspend transport on the Bamako-Kayes, Bamako-Kéniéba, and Bamako-Kadiolo axes, denouncing collapses and deep potholes, according to Bamada and Maliweb. The Kéniéba road is the Malian extension of the southern corridor. Diverting traffic to Moussala is therefore causing an increasing number of trucks to travel on an already fragile road.

Mali supplied intermittently

On the Malian side, the supply holds, but by large escorted convoys rather than a regular flow. On October 3, 643 tankers entered Bamako after a night escort by the Malian armed forces, according to Malijet. From September 14 to 20, 1,273 tankers delivered nearly 58 million liters of diesel and gasoline. Financing is following: on September 24, the BOAD granted 8 billion CFA francs to SOTRAKA to import around 20 million liters, as reported by Financial Afrik.

These convoys secure Bamako, but not the rest of the country. Diesel is fixed at 940 CFA francs per liter since March 28, 2026, while it was selling for 1,250 to 2,500 CFA francs in the center and north in March, according to Sikafinance and APAnews.

Abidjan is not an escape route

Switching to the Ivorian corridor does not solve anything in the short term. It transported 1.47 million tons to Mali in 2025, according to ISS Africa, and tankers have been attacked around Sikasso since October 2025. The risk is shifting rather than disappearing. For shippers and carriers, the question is no longer to find a risk-free route, but to manage the one that remains open.

What can be done in a few weeks

Six measures can be taken without waiting for the end of the crisis.

1. 1. Complete the Moussala section. The minister has requested it; the flow of the entire southern corridor is determined at the border post.
   2. First, repair the black spots on the Malian side. Carriers do not demand a complete rehabilitation, but a quick intervention on the most damaged sections of Bamako-Kéniéba and Bamako-Kayes.
   3. Organize waiting. A parking area set up before the border post, with a clear order of passage, would prevent the queue from overflowing onto the road and protect drivers and goods.
   4. Publish waiting times. Customs, security forces, and shippers’ councils have this information. Making it public every day would allow shippers to choose their departure date and carriers to set a fair price.
   5. Include risk in contracts. The question is no longer just the price of the trip, but who pays for the wait: days of truck immobilization, container fees, storage. Setting them before departure avoids disputes upon arrival.
   6. Build safety stocks in Mali. For industrial and mining companies, when supplies arrive intermittently, a few weeks of stock are better than a lower purchase price.

Public, dated, and sourced data

What stands out in this crisis is the dispersion of information. The condition of a road is read in turn in a ministerial statement, a news dispatch, a shippers’ council note, or a driver’s message, while transport decisions are made every day.

This is why GraceRoad publishes a corridor weather report every Monday: the condition of seven routes from Dakar, Abidjan, Lomé, Cotonou, and Conakry, the official fuel prices in nine countries in the region, and events affecting transport, each information dated and sourced. It is free and open to all: https://graceroad-group.com/meteo-des-corridors

We invite shippers’ councils, customs, and carriers to contribute: one public figure is worth more than ten rumors. The Dakar-Bamako corridor has already weathered crises. It will emerge from this one more quickly if everyone works with the same facts.

The Author

Amara Dramé leads GRACECORP AMD GROUP in Dakar. The company organizes the transportation of goods from Senegal to Mali, Mauritania, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Togo, and Benin, sells and delivers refined petroleum products, and buys agricultural raw materials on behalf of its clients. With a Master of Science in Commodity Trading from the University of Geneva, he spent nine years at QPTC in international trade finance in sub-Saharan Africa. With his team, he publishes GraceRoad’s corridor weather report every Monday. https://graceroad-group.com.

Sources (note for the editorial team, not intended for publication)

1. • ISS Africa, June 4, 2026: blockade reinstated at the end of April 2026, Kidira-Kayes axis, Ivorian corridor (1.47 million tons to Mali in 2025), attacks around Sikasso.
   • AFP, via Connaissance des énergies: blockade announced on September 3, 2025, convoys under escort.
   • APS and PressAfrik, October 1st and 2nd, 2026: Interior Minister’s visit to Moussala, closure of the Kidira route.
   • Tambacounda.info, August 13, 2026, and Senegalese Shippers’ Council: queue of about 15 km at Moussala, unpaved section.
   • APS, August 2026: “Trade losing momentum in Kidira.”
   • SeneNews, October 1st, 2026: gasoline shortage in Kédougou.
   • France 24, January 31, 2026, and AFP (Sahel Intelligence): tankers set on fire between the Senegalese border and Kayes, at least 15 drivers killed.
   • Jeune Afrique: JNIM declaration of November 2025 on tanker drivers; tanker shortage, March 2026.
   • leFaso.net, 2026: target of around 532,000 tons of cottonseed for 2026-2027.
   • Bamada and Maliweb, June 2026: SYNACOR’s threat to suspend on the Bamako-Kayes, Bamako-Kéniéba, and Bamako-Kadiolo axes.
   • Malijet, October 3, 2026: 643 tankers in Bamako; 1,273 tankers and nearly 58 million liters from September 14 to 20.
   • Financial Afrik, September 28, 2026: 8 billion CFA francs from BOAD to SOTRAKA.
   • Sikafinance and APAnews, March 2026: fuel prices in Mali.