In 2026, Senegal will allocate around **5,490 billion CFA francs** – or **almost 10 billion dollars** – to the payment of the **debt service** (principal and interest). This unprecedented amount is **more than double** what was forecasted in the budget when **Macky Sall** left office, confirming a **structural drift** in public finances.
According to the **2026 budget bill**, **almost 70% of the State’s revenue** will be absorbed by debt repayment alone. In other words, for every 100 francs of income, 70 will go to creditors – a scenario that leaves **very little room for investments and social spending**. “Since 2024, we have been witnessing a sort of marathon of revisions,” observes **Muhammad Ba**, a researcher at Gaston Berger University quoted by Radio France Internationale. “For the first time, a UEMOA country is entering the IMF’s red zone.”
**A worrying regional exception**
In the **UEMOA zone**, Senegal stands out due to the magnitude of its debt service. In comparison:
– **Ivory Coast**: around **3,800 billion CFA francs** of debt service in 2026, representing **45%** of its budgetary revenues;
– **Benin**: around **1,200 billion CFA francs**, representing **42%** of its revenues;
– **Burkina Faso**: around **900 billion CFA francs**, representing **38%** of revenues;
– **Togo**: around **620 billion CFA francs**, representing **35%**;
– **Niger**: barely **500 billion CFA francs**, despite slower growth.
Thus, **Senegal finds itself isolated**, with a debt/revenue ratio comparable to that of some heavily indebted countries in Central Africa such as **Cameroon** or **Congo**. At this level, the country exceeds the sustainability thresholds set by the **IMF** and the **World Bank**.
**The rush of domestic borrowing**
Faced with costly external access, **Dakar favors the regional market**. In 2025, the State had already raised **nearly 1,000 billion CFA francs** on the UEMOA financial market, confirming its increased dependence on domestic debt. This substitution strategy – financing from local banks and institutional investors – is not without risks: “The question now is the market’s capacity to absorb such volumes without drying up credit to the private sector,” warns Muhammad Ba on RFI.
**A crisis of confidence on the horizon**
The contrast is striking: in 2019, Senegal’s debt service amounted to **2,100 billion CFA francs**, representing less than 40% of revenues. In seven years, **it has multiplied by 2.6**. This rapid shift results from a combination of several factors:
– the rise in global interest rates since 2022,
– the depreciation of the CFA franc against the dollar,
– the increase in off-budget expenses and public guarantees,
– and the concentration of the bond portfolio in the short term.
For the IMF, this dynamic now places Senegal in a **high-risk category of debt distress**. The necessary adjustment will be painful: tax increases, expenditure cuts, and renegotiation of certain maturities.
In 2026, Senegal will spend **more on its debt than on education, health, and infrastructure combined**. The State finances itself to repay, and repays to refinance. In a region where budgetary prudence remains the norm, Dakar now illustrates the fragility of a model based on permanent debt reliance.
