By Loïc MPanjo Essembe
On March 13, 2026, Senegal will have to honor €333.3 million — equivalent to 219 billion CFA francs — for the eurobonds issued in March 2018. Including principal and interest, the total amount owed to bondholders amounts to $485 million, as confirmed by Reuters and Bloomberg on February 17. The Treasury has raised 510 billion CFA francs on the UEMOA regional market since the beginning of the year. The payment will be made. However, paying in March does not solve the issue for 2026. The total financing needs of the state for the year amount to 6,075.2 billion CFA francs, including 4,307.4 billion for debt amortization alone and 1,245.1 billion for deficit coverage.
Between 2026-2028, Senegal must repay approximately $1.1 billion in eurobonds, with one-third due this year, in a context where its bonds are trading between 50 and 70 cents to the euro — a typical level for distressed debts — and where interest rates on these instruments have risen from 4% to over 12% in recent years. The $1.8 billion IMF program has been suspended since the audits revealed that the public debt is at 119-132% of GDP, compared to the officially announced 73.6% under the previous administration. The wall is documented. The real question is what strategy to use to turn it into a launch pad rather than an impact wall.
The fundamental distinction that the market is waiting for
Two words circulate in the analyses: restructuring and reprofiling. They are not synonymous, and the confusion between the two is costly. Restructuring involves a discount on the principal — the Ghanaian case resulted in a 37% haircut, against an initial debt/GDP ratio of 88%, much lower than that of Senegal today. It implies losses imposed on bondholders, immediate contamination of regional bank balances exposed to Senegalese debt, and a closure of international markets for five to ten years. An analysis by economist Barry Eichengreen confirms that restructuring structurally reduces private investment and weakens domestic financial systems well beyond the immediate cycle.
Reprofiling, on the other hand, is an operation of a radically different nature. It involves extending maturities on high-interest external commercial commitments — commercial loans from Standard Chartered, MUFG, Cargill, and eurobond holders represent about 38% of the external debt, or $18 billion — redirecting towards concessional bilateral and multilateral financing, and converting short-term debt into longer-term instruments without a discount on the principal. It is an act of proactive asset-liability management, not a recognition of default. And that is precisely why it must be engaged now — before the liquidity constraint forces a move towards restructuring. The condition for the market to make the distinction? The quality and analytical depth of the accompanying package.
The 3R strategy: an inseparable triptych
Reprofiling without attached structural reform is just a postponement of the problem. What transforms the operation into a credible rupture signal is the simultaneous and documented combination of three components.
R1 — Reprofiling: lengthening maturities, lightening the service
The target architecture is to extend maturities on external commercial commitments to 10-15 years, with a grace period of 3-4 years on principal repayment — allowing to overcome the 2026-2028 peak and fully benefit from the expected increase in hydrocarbon production from 2027. In parallel, a partial substitution of short-term UEMOA borrowings — which have absorbed 65% of the 2026 financing needs at progressively deteriorating rates, with a weighted average yield that has jumped by 158 basis points in a single month at the end of 2025 — by concessional instruments with long maturities.
This would reduce interest costs, currently set at 1,190.6 billion CFA francs in the 2026 budget, and create operational room for investment. The key to entering this process remains the IMF: a formalized program opens access to concessional multilateral financing and lends credibility to the entire approach with private creditors. An IMF mission stayed in Dakar at the beginning of 2026, and an informal board meeting was held — the window is open, but it will not remain open indefinitely.
R2 — Reform: mobilizing domestic revenues
This is the central and most politically visible pillar. The government has embarked on a documented trajectory: deficit at 12.8% of GDP in 2024, 7.8% in 2025, 5.37% in 2026, 3% in 2027 in line with the UEMOA convergence pact. To meet this trajectory, the Economic and Social Recovery Plan (PRES) aims for 760 billion CFA francs in new revenues in 2026 — some internal Prime Minister’s studies even project 900 billion as a conservative estimate. The tax burden increases from 19.3% to 23.2% of GDP, not through rate hikes but by broadening the tax base and integrating under-taxed sectors: taxing gambling for 300 billion CFA francs, mobile money for 76.5 billion, land regularization, excise duties on alcohol and tobacco.
Beyond current taxation, the most underutilized lever is the monetization of concession audits. The effective implementation of new agreements on projects under renegotiation is projected to generate over 306 billion CFA francs according to Prime Minister’s estimates. Across the portfolio — ports, mining, land, telecoms — systematic adjustment of royalties and competitive auctioning of expiring concessions offer significant additional potential over two years.
On the expenditure side, rationalizing administration — capping jobs per ministry in the 2026 budget, compressing service contracts, reducing parastatal agencies — combined with recycling public assets without property transfer (1,091 billion over four years in the overall PRES framework) represents an underestimated lever. The consolidated sum of these levers for 2026-2027 allows for a net release of around 3,000 to 3,500 billion CFA francs — approximately 5 billion euros — by combining new revenues, savings on expenditure, and debt service relief post-reprofiling.
R3 — Reinvestment: the decade-long plan as the ultimate goal
This is the most absent component in the current Senegalese public debate — and the most decisive for market perception. Defensive consolidation convinces no one if it is not backed by a growth narrative. Senegal has a considerable asset: the start of hydrocarbon production from 2027, which the IMF incorporates into its growth projections at 8-9% for 2025, with an average of 5.5% projected for 2026-2028 driven by primary (+6.5%), tertiary (+6%), and secondary (+3.2%) sectors.
The 44 priority projects of the 2026 PRES — endowed with 633.7 billion CFA francs — constitute a first list covering infrastructure (133.7 billion), energy and mining (432 billion, including 252 billion for rural electrification), agriculture, and health. But the Senegal Vision 2050 deserves a translation into a sectoral decade-long investment plan with quantified targets by sector — hydrocarbons, agro-industry, logistics, digital — and mixed public-private financing mechanisms that transform oil revenue into diversified productive capacity. This is the plan that investment desks are waiting for: not a project list, but a ten-year allocation thesis.
Execution risks
The temptation to settle in March and then decide is real. It is dangerous. The regional market shows signs of saturation: between December 12 and 19, 2025, UEMOA auction subscription rates fell to critical levels, and the weighted average yield jumped by 158 basis points in a month. Out of an amount of 95 billion scheduled on December 12, only 35 billion was effectively mobilized. Continuing to roll over debt on this market at increasing costs transfers sovereign risk to regional bank balances — creating systemic fragility beyond Senegal alone. The main risk is not economic: it is sequential. Each month without a formalized IMF program, without a reform document attached to reprofiling, without a concession renegotiation schedule publicized, reduces the maneuvering window and brings the liquidity constraint closer to the point of no return towards restructuring.
A signal for all French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa
The World Bank has identified 2026 as a peak year for eurobond repayments in sub-Saharan Africa. Several issuers in the UEMOA and CEMAC zones face significant maturities in this context of high rates and restricted access to international markets. A successful Senegalese reprofiling, backed by a credible reform plan and a quantified decade-long investment vision, would set a precedent: it would normalize the sovereign reprofiling tool in the region, still perceived by some institutional investors as a distress signal, and demonstrate that a political break can coexist with documented macroeconomic rigor. Conversely, a slide towards restructuring would durably worsen the risk premium on all French-speaking African issuers at a particularly delicate moment for the region.
Conclusion: debt as a lever, not as a constraint
Paying on March 13 is necessary. It is not sufficient. Senegal’s sovereign credibility will not be measured on the due date — it will be measured in the twelve months following, when the markets assess the gap between documented commitments and effective budgetary actions.
The third way exists, it is quantified and feasible: Reprofiling of external maturities, Budget reform with mobilization of domestic revenues, Reinvestment in a decade-long plan linked to hydrocarbon revenue. These three components are only valuable when combined, precisely documented, sequenced with discipline — and presented as an inseparable package to the markets, the IMF, and bilateral partners.
This well-constructed package would be worth much more than the 5 billion euros it would generate. It would be the restoration of a sovereign signature that neither Senegal nor the region can afford to lose. Market outlook note drafted as independent analysis based on publicly available data at the publication date. The projections presented are working estimates and not certified forecasts.
Loïc MPanjo Essembe
Managing Partner, MEL Investment Banking
Consulting in financing and restructuring of sovereign and corporate debts in sub-Saharan Africa
Douala, Cameroon — February 2026
Sources and references
1. Reuters / Bloomberg (February 17, 2026) — Confirmation of financing for the March 2026 eurobond maturity ($485 million)
2. Senegal Ministry of Finance — 2026 Budget Bill: revenues 6,188.8 billion CFA francs, expenditures 7,433.9 billion CFA francs, deficit 5.37% of GDP
3. Senegal Government / Prime Minister — Economic and Social Recovery Plan (PRES) 2025-2028: objective 5,600 billion CFA francs, including 760 billion in new revenues in 2026
4. Senegal National Public Debt Committee — Medium-term debt management strategy 2026-2028 (January 2026)
5. IMF — Senegal growth projections: 8-9% in 2025, slowing to ~3-5% in 2026; public debt at 132% of GDP end 2024
6. Senegal Court of Auditors / IGF / Forvis Mazars — Public finance audits 2019-2024: 2,500 billion CFA francs gap, debt revalued at 119% of GDP
7. Financial Afrik — Seydina Alioune Ndiaye, “For an organized restructuring of Senegal’s public debt in 2026” (January 2026)
8. Financial Afrik — Prof. Amath Ndiaye, “A PRES focused on the budget, but not on the debt” (August 2025)
9. Financial Afrik — “2026: Senegal at the crossroads of budgetary paths” (January 2026)
10. The Conversation — “Debt crisis: the four levers that can help Senegal avoid restructuring” (December 2025)
11. Capmad.com — “Faye facing the Eurobond debt wall: Imminent default of Senegal?” (February 2026)
12. APA News — 2026 Budget Bill: financing needs 6,075.2 billion CFA francs including 4,307.4 billion in amortization (November 2025)
13. Sika Finance — PRES: new taxes to generate 762.6 billion CFA francs in 2026, including 300 billion from gambling, 76.5 billion from mobile money
14. Le Soleil — PRES 2026: 44 priority projects for 633.7 billion CFA francs including 432 billion for energy-mining, 133.7 billion for infrastructure
15. World Bank — Review of sub-Saharan African sovereign issuers: 2026 identified as peak year for eurobond repayments
16. Barry Eichengreen (academic study) — Impact of sovereign restructurings on private investment and domestic banking systems
17. BCEAO / UEMOA Markets — December 2025 auctions: critical subscription rates, weighted average yield +158 basis points in one month.
