Signed in 2018 in Kigali and entered into force on January 1, 2021, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was supposed to give birth to the world’s largest common market. Four years later, amidst delays, persistent barriers, and the resurgence of nationalism, its future is uncertain. “AfCFTA in the face of the resurgence of nationalism” is at the heart of Financial Afrik’s Grand Debate, with Dr. Mohamed Hamidouch, development banker and former senior executive of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Rivo Ratsimandresy, CEO of the Rencontre des Entrepreneurs (RDE), and Adama Wade, publisher of Financial Afrik, moderated by Amadjiguène Ndoye.
Institutional progress, but limited impact
Certainly, the majority of African countries have ratified the agreement, a permanent secretariat has been established, and several awareness initiatives have been organized across the continent. However, as Dr. Hamidouch points out, “the African street has not yet felt the AfCFTA.” In other words, apart from major conferences and diplomatic meetings, the impact of this initiative remains hardly noticeable in everyday economic life.
To better measure its effectiveness, Dr. Hamidouch emphasizes the need to establish real performance indicators. This includes assessing the share of intra-African trade in total trade, monitoring the volume of cross-border trade, evaluating the level of tariff line openness, analyzing the performance of customs systems. It is also important to monitor the deployment of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), measure the evolution of services and investments, and, most importantly, further integrate small and medium enterprises into regional value chains.
The weight of informal trade and persistent barriers
One crucial element is often overlooked: informal cross-border trade. This sector represents a volume much higher than official statistics, which place intra-African trade between 12 and 20%. In reality, these informal flows reach considerable amounts. For example, annual trade between Morocco and Mauritania in agricultural products is estimated at $2.5 billion, between Tunisia and Libya in fuel and foodstuffs at $1 to $2 billion, and $15 billion in recorded flows on the Abidjan-Accra corridor. Similarly, trade between Kinshasa and Brazzaville represents about $2.5 billion, while the border area between Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad totals around $3.5 billion.
Thus, African trade integration already exists, but it develops outside official channels. This reality reveals the limitations of the current process. Beyond the stated political will, several obstacles hinder the realization of the AfCFTA. Economic nationalisms persist and prompt some countries to protect their domestic markets. Non-tariff barriers remain numerous, including customs complexity, bureaucratic slowness, and lack of harmonization. Furthermore, the commercial dependence on external sources remains strong, with the majority of African trade still conducted with Europe, Asia, or America, a direct legacy of post-colonial economic structures.
In conclusion, the AfCFTA remains a major ambition to transform African trade and promote continental integration. However, four years after its launch, the gap between political vision and economic reality remains significant. To prevent the project from becoming just a slogan, it is essential to address the accumulated delays, strengthen the involvement of SMEs, and recognize the central role of informal trade, a true driving force of exchanges in Africa.
