By El Hadji Abdoulaye Seck
Economist-researcher at the National School of Public Administration of Quebec.
The Economic and Social Recovery Plan (PRES) 2025-2028 presented by the Prime Minister offers us the opportunity to open a debate on the foundations, objectives, and perspectives of the recovery of our economy. To better appreciate the challenges of the PRES, it is appropriate, out of a duty of memory, to briefly review the various economic recovery efforts that have marked the history of Senegal.
In the midst of droughts, oil shocks, and deteriorating public finances, Senegal launched an Economic and Financial Recovery Program (PREF) 1980-1985, supported by the Economic and Social Development Plans (PDES) to benefit from lines of credit dedicated to structural adjustments. Imposed by the IMF and World Bank, the PREF aimed at stabilizing public finances, increasing national savings, optimizing investments, and a progressive disengagement of the State from the economy. Its implementation was based on a triptych of measures: cleansing (closure of embassies and consular representations, reduction of the state’s vehicle fleet, and reduction of subsidies for essential goods), incentives for savings and investment (raising interest rates), and state disengagement.
(introduction of performance contracts and dissolution of certain structures). Despite the sacrifices made, the Bretton Woods institutions did not deem the results of the PREF satisfactory, forcing Senegal to adopt a Medium and Long-Term Adjustment Plan (PAMLT) 1985-1992 anchored to the Plan for Economic and Social Development Orientation (PODES). This plan focused on the restructuring of the parastatal sector (sale of the state’s shares in public companies, dissolution of other structures, and prolonged reduction of subsidies), the recovery of public finances (freeze on recruitment and increase in certain tax burdens), and an economic recovery plan (new agricultural and industrial policies). Once again, imbalances deepened, leading to the accumulation of arrears and an aggravation of the budget deficit. The Sakho-Loum Emergency Plan (1992-1995) was the last recovery plan developed to restore public finances and restore external assets.
Installed in April 2024, the new authorities developed in October of the same year the National Transformation Agenda (ANT), Vision 2050, articulated through a Master Plan 2025-2034, a National Development Strategy (SND) 2025-2029, and Sectoral Policy Letters (LPS). In February 2025, the certification of the audit report on public finances by the Court of Auditors revealed higher levels of deficit and debt than those recorded in the works of the Financial Inspectorate (IGF). This situation led to the suspension of the program with the IMF. The latter asked the State of Senegal to clarify false declarations and take corrective measures to reach a new disbursement program. Thus, the government engaged the Forvis Mazars firm, which completed its preliminary audit. It is in this context that the PRES “Jubbanti Koom” 2025-2028 was born.
This plan is based on 37 measures with the ambition to mobilize 5,667 billion CFA francs of additional resources, restore budgetary balances, and stimulate economic growth. Although full details are not yet available, we welcome the decision to include an economic recovery plan. However, we encourage the government to publish as soon as possible a comprehensive version of the PRES, including the methodological framework and annualized budget projections, necessary for any rigorous evaluation.
One of the most beneficial measures in our view remains the renovation of budget execution procedures, materialized by the introduction of zero-based budgeting from 2026, in accordance with prime instruction 00754/PM/CAB/DC. Zero-based budgeting aims to break with routine budget practices of bureaucracy and require rigorous justification of the efficiency of each expenditure. Furthermore, expanding the tax base to the digital sector is a significant advancement. It is all the more relevant as our country still struggles to achieve the 20% tax pressure target of GDP set by the UEMOA. Moreover, we welcome the authorities’ intention to resort to equity investment to finance the national economy. In an interview with the monthly magazine LE MARCHÉ in November 2024, we argued for IPRES, FONSIS, BNDE, and CDC to combine their efforts to create a powerful strategic investment fund. Such a lever could finance high value-added projects and generate considerable returns on investment. Therefore, the new authorities must expedite the finalization of the two bills relating to economic sovereignty and the doctrine of financing the national economy, discussed in Cabinet respectively on June 26 and October 16, 2024. However, some measures, although relevant, require clarifications. These include those related to lowering food prices, clearing domestic debt, centralizing public procurement, opening public markets to the private sector, and analyzing odious debt. Others, such as taxing online betting, need to be strengthened. This measure, beyond fiscal revenues, is a public health instrument. Sports betting addiction, recognized as a mental health problem by the WHO, is spreading among our youth. Despite controls in kiosks to verify the age of players (minimum 18 years), minors circumvent regulations by using less monitored online betting mobile applications, contributing in some areas to increased school dropout rates and a resurgence of crime. In addition, online betting operators’ marketing strategies deliberately target youth by recruiting influencers and celebrities for aggressive campaigns and massively sponsoring events, thus exacerbating youth addiction. Therefore, beyond taxation, it is urgent to strengthen the legal framework for online betting, drawing inspiration from countries like France, the UK, or the Netherlands, where gambling advertisements are strictly regulated to limit their impact on young people. Regarding the relaxation of the age limit for imported vehicles, we believe that such a measure will only be relevant after effective decongestion of Dakar and the implementation of regional development hubs, to address the economic costs of traffic congestion and the environmental impacts of pollution.
We also call for a structural reflection on the measure concerning the size of the State. Reducing the number of agencies alone is not enough. It is necessary to proceed with a deep refoundation (and not a reform) of the State, breaking away from the colonial model to build a State adapted to our realities and ambitions. This refoundation should not be limited to the executive power but should extend to other powers, namely the judiciary and the legislative. It is legitimate to question, for example, the relevance of a National Assembly with 165 deputies in a country with a low level of human development seeking to rationalize expenses. Furthermore, it would be pertinent to further reflect on the renegotiation of strategic contracts. Although this approach is beneficial, it should be confronted, in certain sectors such as gold mining, with the option of a progressive nationalization, if it guarantees long-term profitability for the State and increased economic sovereignty. Indeed, a sovereignty government should not systematically settle for renegotiation but should explore all options available for the greater good of the nation.
However, we note a major limitation of the PRES: the aim to reduce the budget deficit to 3% of GDP by 2027, which implies a reduction in public investments, especially those financed from internal resources (a decrease of 33% in 2026 and 27% in 2027 if the projections of the DPBEP 2026-2028 are maintained). Such an orientation, in line with the UEMOA convergence criteria, seems counterproductive in the Senegalese context. Public investment remains an essential lever for economic recovery, thanks to its multiplier effect on production and consumption. We must remember that the UEMOA convergence criteria are inspired by the Maastricht criteria of the European Union. Moreover, the latter is faced with member states, once models of budgetary rigor, now assuming prolonged deficits to support their economy. Germany, to name one, has launched a massive investment plan that breaks with budgetary orthodoxy by 2029. Therefore, Senegalese authorities must avoid restoring budget balance at all costs by 2027, risking suffocating the economy and unduly delaying relief for the population.
It is also regrettable that the monetary aspect is absent from the PRES. However, the effectiveness of an economic recovery plan imperatively requires articulation with an adequate monetary policy, thus constituting a coherent policy mix. According to the government, discussions are underway within the UEMOA on monetary reforms favorable to member states. It seems essential to us that Senegalese authorities inform the public about the progress of these negotiations, in light of recent geopolitical developments within the UEMOA. The question of Senegal’s future in the FCFA zone, or even its exit from it, deserves to be posed clearly, methodically, and strategically.
The Jubbanti Koom 2025-2028 constitutes a medium-term response to the current multidimensional crisis. This ambition requires a profound transformation of the inherited economic model, an expansion of our sovereignty in key areas, and a restructuring of the State. Ultimately, the major challenge of any economic and social recovery plan lies in its effective implementation, which requires both firm political will, appropriate institutional capacities, and the involvement of stakeholders.
